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for any benefit the plaintiff would have received but for the agent's
lack of authority." It is submitted that this remedy should have
been be available to the plaintiff in Skyline. In reliance upon the
attorney's representation of authority, the plaintiff entered into a
settlement agreement that, but for the lack of authority, would
40
have been enforceable against Frank Coppotelli.
The Skyline court was correct in rejecting an anomalous rule
that denied a defendant his procedural due process rights when an
attorney appears for him without authorization. However, to protect the plaintiff against the expiration of the statute of limitations
on his claim because the judgment was vacated, the plaintiff
should be provided with a remedy against the offending attorney
sounding in breach of implied warranty of authority. Until a remedy is provided, it is urged that the plaintiff's attorney verify the
authority of counsel who enters an appearance on behalf of a
defendant.
Sheila Corvino

PENAL LAW

Penal Law § 10.00(11): Conduct short of dischargingfirearm constitutes use of deadly physical force; Penal Law § 35.15(2): Defense of justification is applicable to unintentional as well as intentional crimes
Pursuant to section 35.15 of the Penal Law of New York,1 a
that a contract can not be enforced against the principal despite the agent's lack of authority, the agent will not be liable in breach of warranty. See, e.g., Gracie Square Realty Corp.
v. Choice Realty Corp., 305 N.Y. 271, 282, 113 N.E.2d 416, 421 (1953) (contract void under
statute of frauds creates no liability for unauthorized agent).
31 See Cargo Ships El Yam v. Stearns & Foster Co., 149 F. Supp. 754 (S.D.N.Y. 1955);
Harris v. Tams, 258 N.Y. 229, 234, 179 N.E. 476, 478 (1932). See also 3 H. REUSCHLEIN & W.
GREGORY, AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP § 120 (1979) (discussion of damages to be awarded in
warranty action).
40

See 117 App. Div. 2d at 148, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 489.

N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15 (McKinney 1975) provides in pertinent part1. A person may, subject to the provisions of subdivision two, use physical force
upon another person when and to the extent he reasonably believes such to be
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person may use physical force upon another to the extent that he
reasonably believes necessary to defend himself or a third person
from unlawful attack.2 Such person is justified in using deadly
physical force when he reasonably believes his attacker is using or
about to use commensurate force. s Section 10.00(11) of the Penal
Law defines deadly physical force as physical force which is "readily capable of causing death or other serious physical injury.""
Before using deadly physical force, however, the defender has a
duty to retreat if he can do so with complete safety, except under
limited circumstances. 5 Recently, the Court of Appeals, in People
necessary to defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to
be the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by such other person,
unless:
(a) The latter's conduct was provoked by the actor himself with intent
to cause physical injury to another person; or
(b) The actor was the initial aggressor; except that in such case his use
of physical force is nevertheless justifiable if he has withdrawn from the
encounter and effectively communicated such withdrawal to such other
person but the latter persists in continuing the incident by the use or
threatened imminent use of unlawful physical force; or
(c) The physical force involved is the product of a combat by agreement
not specifically authorized by law.
2. A person may not use deadly physical force upon another person under circumstances specified in subdivision one unless:
(a) He reasonably believes that such other person is using or about to
use deadly physical force. Even in such case, however, the actor may not
use deadly physical force if he knows that he can with complete safety as to himself and others avoid the necessity of so doing by
retreating...
Id.
2 Id. at § 35.15(1); see, e.g., People v. Reyes, 116 App. Div. 2d 602, 603, 497 N.Y.S.2d
463, 464 (2d Dep't 1986) (use of bat and knife against decedent greater than necessary
force). See generally Abrahomsky, Justification: Right to Use Deadly Force in New York,
N.Y.L.J., Feb. 4, 1985, at 1, col. 2 (existence of right to use physical force depends on attendant circumstances).
3 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15(2) (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1987); see, e.g., People v.
Collice, 41 N.Y.2d 906, 907, 363 N.E.2d 340, 340, 394 N.Y.S.2d 615, 615-16 (1977) (defendant must reasonably defend self and reasonably perceive threatened deadly physical force
for justification defense to stand).
' See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(11) (McKinney 1975); see also MODEL PENAL CODE §
3.11(2) (1985) (deadly force is that which person uses with purpose of causing death or
serious bodily injury).
I See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15(2)(a) (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1987); see, e.g. , People v.
Dingley, 42 N.Y.2d 888, 890, 366 N.E.2d 877, 877, 397 N.Y.S.2d 789, 790 (1970) (duty to
retreat applicable when crime charged is assault); Reyes, 116 App. Div. 2d at 603, 497
N.Y.S.2d at 464 (defender must attempt to withdraw from encounter despite reasonable
belief that attacker is about to use deadly force); People v. Rodriguez, 111 App. Div. 2d 879,
881, 490 N.Y.S.2d 273, 275-76 (2d Dep't 1985) (evading gunfire as only alternative does not
reflect ability to retreat in safety). The Model Penal Code provides that deadly force is not
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v. Magliato,6 held that the defense of justification is unavailable to
a person who threatens and actively prepares to use deadly physical force upon an attacker, without first attempting to retreat, de7
spite his lack of intent to inflict bodily injury upon such person.
The defendant in Magliato was convicted of depraved indifference murder by a jury from facts arising out of an incident involving an automobile accident." The defendant's car was struck by another car, which immediately sped off with the defendant in
pursuit.9 When the defendant overtook this car, an enraged passenger emerged and waived a billy club threateningly at the defendant. 10 The defendant retreated to his apartment where he
picked up his car registration, his wallet and a loaded handgun.1 1
En route to reporting the incident to the police, the defendant saw
the passenger on the street where he had left him,'2 and got out of
justified "if the actor knows that he can avoid the necessity of using such force with complete safety by retreating .... MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b)(ii) (1985); see also Beale,
Retreat From a Murderous Assault, 16 HARv.L. REv. 567 (1903) (historic discussion of duty
to retreat).
Under certain limited circumstances, New York does not require one to retreat before
using deadly physical force. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15(2)(a) (McKinney 1975 & Supp.
1987). A person has no duty to retreat if: "(i) in his dwelling and not the initial aggressor; or
(ii) a police officer or peace officer or a person assisting a police officer ..... " Id.
6 68 N.Y.2d 24, 496 N.E.2d 856, 505 N.Y.S.2d 836 (1986).
7 See id. at 28-29, 496 N.E.2d at 859-60, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 839-40. For a general discussion of the principle of exculpatory defenses, see People v. Valles, 62 N.Y.2d 36, 38, 464
N.E.2d 418, 419, 476 N.Y.S.2d 50, 51 (1984).
8 Magliato,68 N.Y.2d at 27, 496 N.E.2d at 857, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 837. Depraved indifference murder is defined as, "[u]nder circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to
human life, [one] recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person, and thereby causes the death of another person." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(2)
(McKinney 1975).
9 Magliato, 68 N.Y.2d at 27, 496 N.E.2d at 858, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 838. The defendant
overtook the vehicle which had struck his car and forced it to a stop. Id. The defendant
then got out of his car, holding a tennis racket. Id.
10 Id. The passenger was screaming "I'm going to kill you, get back in the car... ." Id.
11Id. The statement of facts by the Court of Appeals suggests that the defendant
stopped at his apartment while he and his passenger were in search of a police officer. See
id. at 28, 496 N.E.2d at 858, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 838. The Appellate Division, however, suggests
that the two men deliberately returned to the defendant's apartment to get a gun, after
unsuccessfully searching for a police officer. See People v. Magliato, 110 App. Div. 2d 266,
267, 494 N.Y.S.2d 307, 308 (1st Dep't 1985).
12Magliato, 68 N.Y.2d at 27, 496 N.E.2d at 858, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 838. The Court of
Appeals' account describes the defendant as coming upon the passenger accidentally. See id.
The Appellate Division, however, maintains that the defendant purposely drove to the location where he had left the passenger. See Magliato,110 App. Div. 2d at 267, 494 N.Y.S.2d at
308.
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his car to call the police."3 As the defendant began to cross the
street, the passenger lurched out of his car, waving the billy club
and shouting at the defendant.14 The defendant pointed the
weapon at his adversary and cocked it.15 As a car passed between
them the pistol fired, striking the passenger in the head."6 The defendant claimed that he had been startled and that the gun discharged accidentally.17 He asserted that he had never intended to
fire the weapon."8
The Appellate Division, First Department, reduced the conviction to manslaughter in the second degree, on the ground that the
jury was not warranted in finding "depravity" on the part of the
defendant.' 9 The defendant appealed, contending that the defense
of justification encompassing a duty to retreat was inapplicable to
his situation since he was convicted of an unintentional crime.20
"
Magliato,68 N.Y.2d at 27, 496 N.E.2d at 858, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 838. On this point, the
Court of Appeals contends that the defendant was attempting to call the police when the
passenger began his attack. See id. The Appellate Division, however, stated that it was the
defendant's passenger who was attempting to call 911 at the time of the confrontation. See
Magliato, 110 App. Div. 2d at 267, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 308.
14 Magliato, 68 N.Y.2d at 27, 496 N.E.2d at 858, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 838.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 27-28, 496 N.E.2d at 858, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 838. The defendant claimed to have
panicked and stated that he did not recall pulling the trigger. Id. at 27, 496 N.E.2d at 858,
505 N.Y.S.2d at 838. The passenger died two days later. Id. at 28, 496 N.E.2d 858, 505
N.Y.S.2d at 838.
Is Id. Evidence was brought forth at trial tending to prove that the defendant's weapon
had a "hair trigger" to which the slightest pressure would result in discharge. Id. Defense
counsel argued at the charging conference that he did not want the jury instructed on the
defense of justification according to section 35.15 of the Penal Law, since the actual shooting
was an accident. Id.; see supra note 5 and accompanying text (review of the duty to retreat).
For a discussion of the application of the law of justification to unintentional crimes, see
infra note 26 and accompanying text.
'" See Magliato, 68 N.Y.2d at 26, 496 N.E.2d at 857, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 837. "A person is
guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when . . . [hie recklessly causes the death of
another person ..
" N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.15(1) (McKinney 1975). But see supra note 8
(definition of depraved indifference murder).
20 Magliato, 68 N.Y.2d at 28, 496 N.E.2d at 859, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 839. The defendant
reasoned that since the shooting was accidental, it was not in self-defense; alternatively, his
preparatory conduct was intentional, and therefore only that portion of his actions was governed by the law of justification. Id. The defendant argued that since such preparatory conduct did not constitute "deadly physical force," no duty to retreat existed. But see infra
note 25 and accompanying text.
The defendant also argued that his conduct was a "reasoned response to [his attacker's]
threatening conduct." Id. at 26, 496 N.E.2d at 858, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 838. Cf. People v. Goetz,
68 N.Y.2d 96, 107, 497 N.E.2d 41, 48, 506 N.Y.S.2d 18, 25 (1986) (defender's belief that
attacker will use deadly force must "comport with an objective notion of reasonableness").
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Disagreeing with the defendant, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the order of the Appellate Division.2 Judge Hancock, writing for
the court, rejected the defendant's arguments that he was justified
in drawing his weapon to repel the decedent's attack 2 and that the
23
defense of justification is applicable only to intentional crimes.
Holding that the defense of justification applied to the defendant's conduct, the court stressed that the consequences of the defendant's risk-creating conduct, not his intentions, were controlling.24 Thus the court found no merit in the defendant's contention
that justification was inapplicable to this
situation because the de25
fendant had fired the pistol recklessly.
21 See Magliato, 68 N.Y.2d at 31, 496 N.E.2d at 860, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 840.
22

See id. at 28, 496 N.E.2d at 859, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 839. The defendant had contended

that his drawing of the weapon was a reasonable and therefore justifiable act. See id. He
also maintained, however, that the law of justification was inapplicable to his case since his
actions did not constitute the use of "deadly physical force" within the meaning of section
35.15 of the Penal Law. See id. The court rejected these arguments as being "without
merit." See id.; see also infra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
23 See Magliato, 68 N.Y.2d at 29, 496 N.E.2d at 859, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 839. The Court of
Appeals has stated that "there is no basis for limiting the application of the defense of
justification to any particular mens rea." See People v. McManus, 67 N.Y.2d 541, 547, 496
N.E.2d 202, 205, 505 N.Y.S.2d 43, 46 (1986); see also infra note 26 and accompanying text
(discussion of the application of justification defense).
24 Magliato, 68 N.Y.2d at 28-29, 496 N.E.2d at 859, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 839. In People v.
McManus, the court stated that "[j]ustification does not make a criminal use of force lawful;
if the use of force is justified, it cannot be criminal at all." McManus, 67 N.Y.2d at 545, 496
N.E.2d at 204, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 45 (1986). The intent of the actor is therefore irrelevant to
the determination of whether the act was justified. Id. at 547, 496 N.E.2d at 205, 505
N.Y.S.2d at 46. The Model Penal Code, however, states that:
'deadly force' means force that the actor uses with the purpose of causing...
death or serious bodily injury .... Purposely firing a firearm in the direction of
another person or at a vehicle in which another person is believed to be constitutes deadly force. A threat to cause death or serious bodily injury, by the production of a weapon or otherwise, so long as the actor's purpose is limited to creating
an apprehension that he will use deadly force if necessary, does not constitute
deadly force.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.11(2) (1985).
The Model Penal Code's explanatory note reflects the view that a threat is merely the
use of moderate force; accordingly, no duty to retreat is invoked. See id. at § 3.11, commentary at 160 (1985). "[T]he actor who threatens deadly force is not considered to have used
deadly force. . . " Id. at 161 n.9; see also 2 P. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES 3 n.2
(1984) ("threats... do not seem to be covered by the term 'force' ").
25 See Magliato,68 N.Y.2d at 28, 496 N.E.2d at 859, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 839. Alternatively,
the defendant had claimed that drawing his pistol did not constitute "deady physical force"
within the meaning of Penal Law section 35.15; therefore, he had no duty to retreat. Id. The
court rejected that argument, holding that the defendant's conduct rose to the level of
"deadly physical force." See id. at 28-29, 496 N.E.2d at 859, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 839. But see W.
LAFAvE & A. Scorr, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 651 (1986) ("merely to threaten death or
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The court in Magliato noted that it is the established law in
New York that the application of the defense of justification is not
resticted to any particular mens rea.2s The court may instruct the
jury on the law of justification whenever any evidence is adduced
at trial that the defendant acted in self defense. Moreover, the
only justification for the use of deadly physical force in self-defense is contained in the Penal Law.2
Finally, the court held that the defendant's preparatory conduct constituted the use of deadly physical force. 29 Accordingly,
subsection two of section 35.15 was applicable and the duty to retreat thereby invoked.30 The court equated the drawing and cocking of a loaded pistol with the use of deadly force since "it creates
a danger so nearly approximating the discharge of a pistol as to be
serious bodily harm, without any intention to carry out the threat, is not to use deadly
force").
" See Magliato, 68 N.Y.2d at 28, 496 N.E.2d at 859, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 839; see also
McManus, 67 N.Y.2d at 544, 496 N.E.2d at 205, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 46 (1986)(justification defense available to a person convicted of depraved indifference murder). The McManus court
based its decision on the fact that section 35.15 of the Penal Law contains no limiting language with respect to what offenses are applicable to the law of self-defense. See id; see also
People v. Huntley, 59 N.Y.2d 868, 870, 452 N.E.2d 1257, 1258, 465 N.Y.S.2d 929, 930 (1983)
(justification defense available to defendant convicted of second degree manslaughter); People v. Ciervo, 123 App. Div. 2d 393, 394, 506 N.Y.S. 2d 462, 463 (2d Dept't 1986) (same);
People v. Rodwell, 100 App. Div. 2d 772, 772, 474 N.Y.S.2d 45, 46 (1st Dep't 1984) (same);
People v. Burnell, 84 App. Div. 2d 566, 566, 443 N.Y.S.2d 261, 261 (2d Dep't 1981) (defendant's not guilty plea does not preclude submission of justification defense to jury).
27 See People v. Goetz, 68 N.Y.2d 96, 106, 497 N.E.2d 41, 47, 506 N.Y.S.2d 18, 24 (1986)
(evidence of justification warrants instruction to jury regardless of defense request); People
v. Kahn, 113 App. Div. 2d 773, 774, 493 N.Y.S.2d 364, 365 (2d Dep't 1985) (jury instruction
on justification issue applicable to first degree manslaughter), aff'd mem., 68 N.Y.2d 921
(1986); People v. Jenkins, 93 App. Div. 2d 868, 870, 461 N.Y.S.2d 378, 380 (1983) (same);
People v. Benjamin, 47 App. Div. 2d 861, 861-62, 366 N.Y.S.2d 44, 45 (1975) (same).
28 See Magliato, 68 N.Y.S.2d at 30, 496 N.E.2d at 860, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 840. The legislature has also authorized the use of deadly physical force to affect the arrest of one who has
committed a designated felony. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.30 (McKinney 1975 & Supp.
1987). But see People v. Jacobs, 105 Misc. 2d 616, 621, 432 N.Y.S.2d 614, 619 (N.Y.C. Crim.
Ct. N.Y. County 1980) (robbery victim not justified in recklessly shooting bystander while
attempting to arrest fleeing felon).
29 See Magliato,68 N.Y.2d at 29, 496 N.E.2d at 860, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 840. The court did
not term this conduct preparatory, but instead stated that the defendant's conduct could
not properly be described as "a mere display, threat, or preparation for the use of deadly
physical force." Id. Indeed, the court continued, "[it] would be illogical to restrict the meaning of the 'use of deadly physical force' to the deliberate discharge of a weapon or the intentional infliction of bodily injury, and to characterize as mere 'preparation' all other conduct
with a deadly instrumentality which falls short of that." Id.; see supra notes 4 and 24 (discussion of what constitutes deadly physical force).
30 See Magliato, 68 N.Y.2d at 29-31, 496 N.E.2d at 859-61, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 839-40; see
also supra notes 1 (text of § 35.15) and 5 (discussion of duty to retreat).
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reasonably deemed its equivalent for the purpose of the law of justification."'" In the court's view, this type of preparatory conduct
was a "deadly
act regardless of how or why the final bit of pressure
'32
is applied.

It is submitted that the court properly construed section 35.15
of the Penal Law as applicable to both intentional and unintentional crimes, and was also correct in its interpretation of "deadly
physical force" in the instant case. It is suggested, however, that
the court's distinction between the "display[ing] or brandishing of
a pistol" in self-defense and drawing, cocking and aiming a
weapon33 may lead to future jury confusion as to what conduct
constitutes the use of, rather than the preparation for, deadly
force.
Practically speaking, the holding in Magliato implies that an
individual must first attempt to retreat when possible, before
threatening the use of deadly physical force, if such threat would
create a substantial risk of serious bodily injury to the attacker
and would itself equate deadly physical force. 4 This requirement
is applicable regardless of the defender's intention to inflict or re,Magliato, 68 N.Y.2d at 30, 496 N.E.2d at 860, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 840. But see supra
note 24 (mere production of weapon not deadly force). For the purpose of determining civil
liability, the Restatement (Second) of Torts creates a distinction between threatening and
using deadly force similar to that found in the Model Penal Code. The Restatement provides in pertinent part:
The actor may be privileged in self-defense to do an act which is intended to put
another in immediate apprehension of a harmful or offensive contact or other bodily harm or a confinement, which is in excess of that which the actor is privileged
to inflict, if his act is intended and reasonably believed by him to be likely to do
no more than to create such an apprehension.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 70(2) (1977).
The particular weapon used by the defendant has a significant impact on the issue of
reasonableness. The defendant proved at trial that the pistol had an extremely sensitive
"hair trigger." See Magliato, 68 N.Y.2d at 27, 496 N.E.2d at 858-59, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 838-39.
Therefore, it was reasonably foreseeable that the pistol would discharge upon application of
the slightest pressure, and accordingly, that cocking and aiming this loaded pistol could
result in the decedent's death. See Magliato, 110 App. Div. 2d at 271, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 31112 (Asch, J., dissenting). Since the defendant had been instructed on the use of this particular weapon, holding him to this level of culpability is not unfair. See id.
82 Magliato, 68 N.Y.2d at 30, 496 N.E.2d at 860, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 840; see supra note 28.
The court explained that "leveling a loaded pistol with the cocked hammer set to release
under the slightest pressure, and pointing it at another approaching from across the street is
conduct well beyond a warning or preparation for a deadly act." Magliato, 68 N.Y.2d at 30,
496 N.E.2d at 860, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 840.
'3Magliato, 68 N.Y.2d at 30, 496 N.E.2d at 860, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 840. For a discussion
of the importance of such a distinction, see Abrahomsky, supra note 2, at 1.
34See Magliato, 68 N.Y.2d at 30, 496 N.E.2d at 860, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 840.
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strain from inflicting bodily injury upon the attacker.3 5 It is submitted that this fine line between deadly and non-deadly threatening conduct needs to be more clearly defined in order to better
effectuate the purpose of the law of self-defense.
Mary Flynn

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW

A common carrier,whether municipally or privately owned, may
be liable for the failure of its employees to summon aid upon witnessing the attack of a passenger
Although municipal corporations have traditionally enjoyed
governmental immunity from liability in tort,' all states have consented to waive this immunity to some extent. 2 New York distinSee id. at 29, 496 N.E.2d at 860, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 840.

W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 1051 (5th ed. 1984):
The traditional rule was that municipalities held a governmental immunity in
tort, but one different both in origin and scope from the 'sovereign' or governmental immunity of the state. Since municipalities exhibited a corporate or proprietary face ....the traditional immunity was narrower than the full range of municipal activities, protecting only the governmental activities and not the
proprietary ones.
Id. The doctrine of sovereign immunity originated in England and is based on the concept
that "the King can do no wrong." Id. at 1032-33. "[Sovereign immunity] was accepted by
American judges in the early days of the republic, and ever since the law of the United
States has been that, except to the extent the government consents to suit, it is immune."
Id. Municipal tort immunity has its roots in the sovereign immunity doctrine. See Note,
Municipal Tort Liability For Criminal Attacks Against Passengers on Mass Transportation, 12 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 325, 326 (1984) [hereinafter Municipal Tort]; Note, Municipal
Torts: The Rule Is Liability-The Exception Is Immunity-Enghauser Manufacturing Co. v.
Eriksson Engineering Ltd., 9 U. DAYTON L. REv. 327, 328 (1984) [hereinafter Note].
2 Municipal Tort, supra note 1, at 326. New York State's waiver of sovereign immunity
was effected through the Court of Claims Act. N.Y. Judiciary Court of Claims Act Law § 8
(McKinney 1963). Other states have similarly waived immunity for tort liability. See, e.g.,
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-4707-08 (1978); ME.REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8104 (1980); MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 3.996(107) (Callaghan 1985); Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-29-83 (1972). One reason for the
waiver of sovereign immunity is the "availability and use of insurance or other modern
funding methods [which] render an argument based on economics invalid." Enghauser Mfg.
Co. v. Eriksson Eng'g Ltd., 6 Ohio St. 3d 31, 34, 451 N.E.2d 228, 231 (1983).
New York's Court of Claims Act provides, in part, that "the state hereby waives its
immunity from liability.., and consents to have the same determined in accordance with

